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Abstract: This paper examines the quiz show "Jeopardy!." In the game, players accumulate 
points then wager them in a final round on a single question. My study finds an empirically-best 
wagering system for these players, then calculates the benefit of using this system through 
additional games that would be won with the correct bet. My regression model then finds the 
determinants of empirically-best (EB) betters. The results show players tend to act 
too aggressively. Half of non-first place players wager incorrectly and nearly 90% of those non-
EB wagers are too large. The regression shows players are most likely to make the EB bet when 
the correct wager is predictable, simple, and large. 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the betting strategies of contestants on the game show “Jeopardy!” 
Game shows have been popular among economists because of their well-defined rules and the 
significant amount of money on the line (Metrick 1995). Metrick started the trend of examining 
Jeopardy in 1995 with his ground-breaking research. His paper was the first to study Jeopardy, 
and it provided a statistical overview of how players wagered in two-person games. 
Jeopardy is a quiz show in the United States, and each game has three contestants who 
vie for the most points by the end of the game. In the first round, or the “Jeopardy! round,” six 
categories are revealed with five questions each. The first clue in the category is worth 100 
points, the second 200 points, and so forth. A player selects one of the categories and values 
(such as U.S. Presidents for 300), and the question is read. All three players have an opportunity 
to buzz in and give an answer1. If the player guesses correctly, the points are added to her score. 
If the player guesses incorrectly, the points are subtracted from her score, and the others players 
are given an opportunity to buzz in. After a player answers correctly, she is given control of the 
board and chooses the next clue. 
After all the clues are given or time runs out, the players move on to the “Double 
Jeopardy!” (DJ) round. In this second round, six new categories with five questions each are 
                                                 
1 As Metrick notes, Jeopardy fans know that each clue actually reveals an “answer” and contestants are trying to 
provide a “question.” I use the conventional wording for the sake of simplicity. 
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revealed and the points are doubled (the first clue is worth 200, the second 400, and so forth). 
The same rules apply. 
At the end of the DJ round, all players with a positive point total move onto the “Final 
Jeopardy!” (FJ) round. A category is given, then each player writes down the number of points 
they wish to wager. After the wager is locked in, the clue is given, and each player writes down 
their answer. Then, the answers and wagers are revealed. Each player answering correctly gains 
the number of points wagered, and each player answering incorrectly loses the number of points 
wagered. No player can wager more points that he has accumulated throughout the Jeopardy and 
DJ rounds. Following FJ, the player with the most points is the champion and returns to the next 
show. The third place player wins $1000, the second place player wins $2000, and the first place 
player wins $1 for each point accrued. If two players are tied for the highest score, both return as 
champions. 
The FJ round thus provides an interesting look at strategic decisions under uncertainty for 
players. It has been the subject of research for both mathematicians (Gilbert and Hatcher 1994) 
and economists (Metrick 1995), and has been studied both empirically and theoretically. This 
paper looks to synthesize that research to suggest an empirically-best (EB) bet and find the 
determinants of players making that bet. 
Let us examine a hypothetical game to model these decisions. Going into FJ, player A 
has 10,000 points, player B has 9,000, and player C has 3,000. In most cases, player A will make 
a wager of 2*B – A + 1 where “B” represents player B’s score and “A” represents player A’s 
score. A correct answer will give player A a score of 2B + 1, effectively locking player B out of 
an opportunity to win the game. Player B, realizing this, must put herself in a situation to win if 
player A gives an incorrect answer. If player A answers incorrectly, his score will become A - 
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(2*B – A + 1), or 2*A – 2*B – 1. Player B thus, to beat player A, should bet such that B – X > 
2*A – 2*B – 1, where X represents player B’s wager. In this situation, 9,000 – 7,000 > 2*10,000 
– 2*9,000 – 1. The wager to beat player A should be 0 ≥ Wager ≥ 7,0002. Of course, player B 
still needs to contend with player C. If she wagers such that B – X, where X is her wager, is 
greater than 2*C, she guarantees herself a score greater than player C. In this case, wagering 
2,999 or less would satisfy that condition. Thus, player B’s bet should be 0 ≥ Wager ≥ 2,999 to 
assure a higher score than player C and to allow her to win if player A is incorrect. 
Player C now examines his situation. He knows that to win, player A and player B both 
must answer incorrectly. He knows player A will wager 8,001. If he is incorrect, player A will 
fall to 1,999 points. He knows player B can wager 2,999 or less and lock him out of the game, so 
he must hope player B over-bets and is incorrect. Thus, a wager between 0 and 1,000 provides 
the greatest opportunity to win. 
In looking at the EB bet, the key is to maximize the number of answer types that will 
provide a win. In our hypothetical situation, player A knows he will win in a RRR game (that is, 
player A is “right” in his answer, as is player B, and player C), a RRW game (again, player A 
and B are both “right” and player C is “wrong”), a RWW game, and a RWR game. He also 
stands to win in a WWW game if players B and C over-bet. Player B wins in WRR, WRW, 
WWR, and WWW games. Player C wins in WWR and WWW games if player B over-bets. 3 
When one player has negative points going into FJ, they are removed from the game, and 
only the remaining two players are allowed to wager. In these situations, the strategy becomes 
                                                 
2 Occasionally, player A will give player B an opportunity to create a tie game by wagering 2B – A. Player B may 
then be prudent, in this example, to wager 0 ≥ Wager ≥ 6,999 to assure a sole win in the event of an incorrect answer 
by player A. 
3 This assumes players are acting as my empirical evidence suggests them to act. In this hypothetical game, if player 
A expects player B to make the empirically-best bet of 2,999, he may be better off wagering 2,000 to win in WWW, 
WWR, RWR, RRR, RRW, and RWW games.  This paper does not examine the implications of players starting to 
implement this strategy. 
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much simpler. Let us look at another hypothetical situation in which player A has 15,000 points, 
player B has 8,000 points, and player C has -500 and will not continue on to FJ. In this case, 
player A again makes the lock-out bet (2*B – A + 1). She wagers 1001. Player B, expecting this 
bet, knows he can only win if player A is incorrect. He wagers between 6,000 and 8,000 to have 
a score large enough to win if player A is incorrect and he is correct. Looking at the answer 
types, player A wins in RR, RW, and WW games. Player B wins in a WR game. 
In some games, player A’s score will be greater than 2*B are the start of FJ. These are 
known as runaway games (J! Archive 2010) and were excluded from the data set because they 
provide no interesting strategic choices. Player A should always bet such that A – X > 2*B, 
where X is her wager, and she will always win. 
The other interesting game type is ties. In 2000, a round of DJ ended with all three 
players tied at 5,200 points. Players A and B wagered all 5,200 in FJ and player C only wagered 
5,000. All three players answered correctly and players A and B returned as co-champions while 
player C was eliminated (J! Archive 2010). Player C was probably hoping to hedge his bets by 
having some points left over if all three players were wrong. A wager of 0 would have 
accomplished the same goal and not left him susceptible to both a bet of 5,200 and a bet of 0. In 
the event of a tie, the EB wagers are everything or nothing. 
This paper will gather data from a list of Jeopardy games, apply a formula for the EB bet, 
and then test for the determinants of EB betters. 
 
Literature Review 
 Game Theory has a long and storied history in economics beginning with von Neumann 
and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944). The field evolved with 
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Nash’s work in non-cooperative games and the development of what was later coined “Nash’s 
Equilibrium” (1951). Game Theory explains the decision-making of people as rational beings. 
While this is not a novel concept, its innovative approach considered the actions of other players 
as rational decision makers before coming to a rational choice (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994).  
 Economists quickly latched onto Game Theory as a mathematical approach to solving 
utility problems. While mathematical models made economics problems easier to solve, the 
approach soon came under attack. Simon (1955) finds six criteria needed for a model of rational 
decision-making, including full knowledge of the odds of specific outcomes. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) found that people value certainty over risk more than a rational model would 
expect and proposed a new theory to accommodate this discrepancy. Loomes and Sugden (1982) 
suggest regret and rejoicing need to be factored into rational choice models. 
 More recently, economists have looked to empirical evidence to question the assumptions 
made by neoclassical theory. Game shows have become a popular way to do this because of their 
well-defined rules and the significant amount of money on the line (Metrick 1995). Metrick was 
the first to examine Jeopardy with his 1995 paper. While only studying the first and second place 
players, he found that players were making non-EB choices in a predictable pattern. 
 Since Metrick, no major, overarching study on Jeopardy has been completed. Meanwhile, a 
simple three-player wagering strategy has been established (Gilbert and Hatcher 1994) and a fan 
website carefully compiles each day’s games (J! Archive 2010). The conditions are perfect for 
new research. 
 
Data 
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Data were collected from the fan created J! Archive. The site was created by 74 game 
Jeopardy champion Ken Jennings. It is updated daily by a team of former Jeopardy players and 
fans and includes every clue, answer, and wager as well as limited demographics of each player 
(J! Archive 2010). Game types were categorized using Gilbert and Hatcher’s model (1994). Data 
were collected from games aired between September 2009 and December 2010. Excluded from 
the data set were runaway games, players who had a negative score at the end of DJ, and games 
where a special relationship existed between the scores.  
Data on 239 games were collected and 62 were excluded, leaving 177 games and 523 FJ 
wagers. Because players with negative scores are eliminated before FJ, the data set includes eight 
more observations from player A and B than player C. The answer type distribution is as 
follows: 
 
 
TABLE 1 - FREQUENCY OF 
ANSWERS TYPES 
 
TABLE 2 - FREQUENCY OF CORRECT 
ANSWERS BY PLAYER 
Type Sample Frequency 
 
Player Correct Responses Frequency 
RRR 34 0.192 
 
Player A 93 0.525 
RRW 16 0.090 
 
Player B 94 0.531 
RWR 18 0.102 
 
Player C 80 0.473 
RWW 21 0.119 
 
Total 267 0.510 
WRR 12 0.068 
    WRW 28 0.158 
 
 
  WWR 16 0.090 
    WWW 24 0.136 
    RR 2 0.011 
    RW 2 0.011 
    WR 2 0.011 
    WW 2 0.011 
    Total 177 1.0 
     
Notes: “R” represents a “right” or correct 
answer in FJ. “W” represents a “wrong” or 
incorrect answer. The first letter represents 
the answer of the player in first place after 
DJ, the second letter, second place, and so 
forth. 
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Each game was categorized by a game type, corresponding to the game types proposed by 
Gilbert and Hatcher (1994). The condition for each type and the EB bet for players B and C are 
shown below. Player A’s EB bet is always assumed to be the lock-out bet. 
TABLE 3 - GAME TYPE CONDITIONS 
Abbreviation Condition Wager for Player B Wager for Player C 
1 (3/2)B < A < 2B B C 
2 B+(C/2) < A < (3/2)B, A+C < 2B  3B − 2A − 1B − 2C − 1 C 
3 B+(C/2) < A < (3/2)B, 2B < A+C 3B - 2A - 1 C 
4 A < B+(C/2), (3C/2) < B < 2C 2C - B + 1 2B + C - 2A - 1 
5 A < B+(C/2), 2C < B B - 2C - 1 0 
6 A < B+(C/2) < 2C, A + C < 2B 2C - B + 1 0 
7 A < B+(C/2) < 2C, 2B < A+C B - C - 1 0 
2P Two Player Games Conditional None 
 
In two-player games, there are two different game types to consider. When 2A – 2B – 1 > B, 
player B should wager B ≥ Wager ≥ 2A – 3B. When B > 2A – 2B – 1, player B should wager 3B 
– 2A ≥ Wager ≥ 0. 
Table 4 shows the frequency with which each game type occurs and the frequency in 
which players make the EB wager. The EB wager represents a range of values. A player is 
considered to have made the EB bet if she does not put herself in a position to lose to an answer 
type where she would have won with the EB wager. For example, look at our earlier hypothetical 
game where player A has 10,000 points, player B 9,000, and player C 3,000. This game would 
fall into game type 5. Player A’s EB bet is 8,001. Again, I identify the answer types where he 
wins: RRR, RRW, RWR, and RWW. Player B’s EB bet is B – 2C – 1, which is 2,999. She wins 
in WRR, WRW, WWR and WWW games. A wager of 2,000 would show player B to be risk 
adverse, but would still allow her to win with the same game types, so it is best bet empirically. 
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A wager of 4,000 opens up player B to a loss in WWR games; it is not EB. Assuming player B 
does not make too large of a bet, player C cannot win. 
TABLE 4 - FREQUENCY OF GAME TYPES 
Game 
Type 
Number 
of Games Frequency Number EB 
Number 
of Wager Freq EB 
1 41 0.23 111 123 0.90 
2 39 0.22 83 117 0.71 
3 8 0.045 15 24 0.63 
4 21 0.12 34 63 0.54 
5 18 0.10 31 54 0.57 
6 19 0.11 37 57 0.65 
7 23 0.13 28 69 0.41 
2P 8 0.045 10 16 0.63 
TOTAL 177 1.0 349 523 0.63 
 
For each game, I then applied this new strategy for each player to see if the outcome of the 
games changed. Table 5 shows the results by player. 
TABLE 5 – EMPRICALLY-BEST WAGERS BY PLAYER 
Player A 
 
Player B 
 
Player C 
Situation # 
 
Situation # 
 
Situation # 
Total Games 177 
 
Total Games 177 
 
Total Games 169 
Wins Originally 115 
 
Wins Originally 49 
 
Wins Originally 13 
Wins EB 115 
 
Wins EB 64 
 
Wins EB 16 
# of Wagers 
Not EB 
17 
 
# of Wagers 
Not EB 
88 
 
# of Wagers 
Not EB 
69 
Frequency 
Not EB 
0.096 
 
Frequency 
Not EB 
0.497 
 
Frequency 
Not EB 
0.408 
Number of Overbets 3 
 
Number of Overbets 80 
 
Number of Overbets 56 
Frequency Overbet 0.176 
 
Frequency Overbet 0.909 
 
Frequency Overbet 0.812 
 
Using the EB strategy, players B and C were able to pick up a combined 18 additional wins. 
Note that when players do not make the EB bet, players B and C make a wager larger than the 
EB wager a vast majority of the time. This explains why they make the correct bet in game type 
1 90% of the time; the EB wager is to bet everything. 
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Models 
My model for the tendency to make the EB wager is as follows: 
EB = β1X + ε 
Where: 
 EB =  Dummy variable for making the EB wager (1 for EB bet, 0 for non-EB bet); 
 X =  A vector of explanatory variables; 
 ε =  An error term. 
The vector of explanatory variables includes: 
 DJPLC =  A player’s standing at the end of DJ; 
 PERCBET = The EB bet divided by the player’s score; 
TEACH =  A dummy variable for a profession involving teaching (1 for teacher, 0 for 
non-teacher); 
GT4 =  A dummy variable for game type four (1 for game type four, 0 for any 
other game type). 
DJPLC is a variable to account for the difficulty of wagers. First place always has the same 
wager to make. The game is in the player’s hands and she does not have to consider the actions 
of other players. Conversely, the third place player is often in a dire situation. Many games 
require both players A and B to miss the question and for player B to overbet. In situations that 
appear this desperate, player C will often bet everything and hope for a miracle. PERCBET 
accounts for a player’s propensity to overbet. When the EB wager is to bet everything, players 
may luck into the correct wager. I attempted to include a variable to measure the natural 
selection of Jeopardy’s rules. Players making EB bets should be more likely to return as 
champions and returning as a champion provides more opportunities to learn the EB wagers. 
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These variables were highly correlated with DJPLC. Unsurprisingly, the more successful the 
player has been in previous games of Jeopardy, the more likely they were to be in first place at 
the end of DJ. GT4 was selected because of its relative difficulty in calculating the correct wager. 
Other game types with unusually high or low EB wager rates were correlated with PERCBET. 
TEACH was chosen as a measure of overestimating one’s odds of correctly answering the FJ 
question. Another measure attempted was players with an advanced degree, inferred from 
profession. With the underemployed rate at over 20% (Marlar 2010) and players likely being 
better educated than the general population (Metrick 1995), it is not an accurate measure. 
TABLE 6 - SUMMARY STATISTICS 
NAME N MEAN ST. DEV VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
EB 523 0.67 0.47 0.22 0 1 
PERCBET 523 0.52 0.38 0.15 0 1 
DJPLC 523 1.98 0.81 0.66 1 3 
TEACH 523 0.13 0.33 0.11 0 1 
GT4 523 0.12 0.33 0.11 0 1 
 
Empirically-Best Wager Regression Results 
I use a logit regression because of the dummy dependent variable. Table 7 shows the 
results. 
TABLE 7 - REGRESSION RESULTS 
NAME 
MARGINAL 
EFFECT T-RATIO SIGNIFIGANCE 
DJPLC -0.189 -6.397 ** 
PERCBET 0.586 9.570 ** 
TEACH -0.142 -2.129 * 
GT4 -0.115 -1.785 
  
**-significant at 1% level 
*-significant at 5% level 
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The regression generated a McFadden R-square of 0.25. This pseudo R-square takes one minus 
the sum of the log-likelihood function of the model divided by the log-likelihood function of the 
intercept. If there is no difference between the log-likelihoods, the R-square will equal zero 
(Wooldridge 2009, 581). Other R-squares varied between 0.27 and 0.38. The low R-square is 
due to a variety of reasons. Each FJ has a unique category that is given to players before they 
submit their wagers. Players may believe themselves more or less likely to answer a question 
correctly based on that category. Without interviewing contestants, it is impossible to derive 
confidence. I also have no way of gauging familiarity with the Jeopardy community. Sites such 
as J! Archive extensively discuss wagering strategies, giving an advantage to contestants who 
frequent them. 
The model reveals contestants are far more likely to correctly wager when the EB bet is 
large, simple, and predicable. This result is predicted by Gilbert and Hatcher (1994) who found 
players make overly-aggressive wagers. 
 
Behavioral Economics 
 Behavioral economics is a new approach to economics that challenges the traditional 
neoclassical model. It seeks to dispel the idea of rational consumers in favor of modeling how 
they actually act. DellaVigna (2009) argues behavioral economics differs by “asserting (1) 
nonstandard preference, (2) nonstandard beliefs, and (3) nonstandard decision making” (315). It 
focuses on real world and experimental data of individual choice making rather than modeled 
behavior. 
 The emergence of behavioral economics has the potential to alter our understanding of 
human behavior, and has already been adopted by entrepreneurs and government entities. Thaler 
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and Benartzi (2004) recognize our lack of self-control and our focus on nominal, rather than real 
wages. Their Save More Tomorrow plan allows employees to commit their future wage increases 
to a retirement plan, and has drastically increased savings rates. Seventy-eight percent of 
sampled employees joined the plan, and 80 percent stayed with the plan through their fourth pay 
raise (S165). If employees had wanted to invest these raises, traditional economic theory 
suggests they would have done it without the plan. Yet, a vast majority of individuals joined the 
plan and continued with it. 
 Behavioral economics can even have an impact in lunchrooms. Moving fruit next to the 
cash register, salads to the middle of the room, and allowing students a choice in their vegetable 
side reduces waste and leads to more nutritious meals for K-12 students (Just and Wansink 
2009). Again, traditional economic models would not have predicted these behaviors. Rational 
consumers are not impacted by the location of goods. 
 My paper adds to this growing field. Gilbert and Hatcher’s wagering strategy is not new. 
It gives players the ability to increase their winning percentage, by a considerable amount, 
without any additional costs or risks. Yet, in the nearly twenty years since it has been published, 
little has changed in players’ wagering strategies. Neoclassical theory predicts arbitrage will 
eliminate this advantage in the market, but in reality players are exhibiting nonstandard decision 
making. 
The implications of this finding are not obvious. I find that players struggle to make 
complicated, unpredictable, and small wagers. While this may not lend itself to any new product 
or service, it is a starting place to finding arbitrage in other markets. 
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Future Research 
A common wager in Jeopardy for players B and C is to bet everything but a point or two. 
The logic is to still have a couple of points left if everyone answers incorrectly. In some 
circumstances, this can boost a player from 3rd place into 2nd place. The model I used, however, 
makes no accommodations for this strategy; it focuses solely on winning. While the EB bet can 
allow players to beat players they otherwise would not, any measure of mean outcome is tainted 
by the inability to compete with the aforementioned strategy. I hope a future model can find the 
ideal number of points to leave, which would enable us to see the real advantage of EB wagers. 
Another topic for future research is professions. The model makes it clear players wager 
empirically-best when the bet is simple and large. Contestants educated in statistics or economics 
may be better able to wager EB with complicated and/or small bets. My sample size was too 
small to test these variables, but future research could find a large sample of these contestants 
and test their results against the general population of Jeopardy players. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper was an attempt to show the advantages of making the EB wager in Final 
Jeopardy and to find the determinants of EB bettors. Seventeen years after Gilbert and Hatcher’s 
paper (1994), players still have not adapted to the empirical best bet. Contestants still wager too 
aggressively and leave room for third place players to walk away with wins. 
I find that players will have a far greater chance of winning a game of Jeopardy by 
following Gilbert and Hatcher’s (1994) wagering outline. This assumes that other players are not 
knowledgeable of the EB wagers, but given the amount of time this information has been 
available with no empirical changes, the assumption is far from bold. I also find large, simple, 
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and predicable bets as the key determinants of EB wagering players and that overconfidence in 
the ability to correctly answer a question may lead to sub-EB bets. 
 
  
Boeckmann 15 
 
References 
DellaVigna, Stefano. "Pschology and Economics: Evidence from the Field." Journal of 
Economic Literature, 2009: 315-371. 
 
Gilbert, George T., and Rhonda L. Hatcher. "Wagering in Final Jeopardy!" Mathematics 
Magazine, October 1994: 268-277. 
 
J! Archive. 2010. http://www.j-archive.com (accessed October 25, 2010). 
 
Just, David R., and Brian Wansink. "Smarter Lunchrooms: Using Behavioral Economics to 
Improve Meal Selection." Choices, March 2009. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." 
Econometrica, 1979: 263-292. 
 
Loomes, Graham, and Robert Sugden. "Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational 
Choice Under Uncertainty." The Economic Journal, 1982: 805-824. 
 
Marlar, Jenny. Underemployment Rises to 20.3% in March. April 1, 2010. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/127091/underemployment-rises-march.aspx (accessed 
January 22, 2011). 
 
Metrick, Andrew. " A Natural Experiment in "Jeopardy!"." The American Economic Review, 
1995: 240-253. 
 
Nash, John. "Non-Cooperative Games." The Annals of Mathematics, 1951: 286-295. 
 
Osborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994. 
 
Simon, Herbert A. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1955: 99-118. 
 
Thaler, Richard, and Shlomo Benartzi. "Same More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to 
Increase Employee Saving." Journal of Political Economy, 2004: S164-S187. 
 
Von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey. Introductory Econometrics. Mason, OH: South-Western, 2009. 
 
 
  
